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Plaintiff-Appellant Arthur Biggs submits this Reply Brief to 
the brief of Defendant-Appellee David Calvert. 
A. Long-arm Statute 
i. Contacts 
Calvert claims that the exhibits attached to Biggs' complaint 
do not help Biggs' claim that the district court had personal 
jurisdiction. Specifically, Calvert quotes language from STV Int' 1 
Marketing v. Cannondale Corp., 750 F. Supp. 1070, 1077 (D. Utah 
1990): 
The nexus requirement is not met whenever there is 
creation or breach of a contract with a Utah plaintiff. 
Nor would the circumstance of presence in Utah by way of 
correspondence and telephone calls, without more, 
necessarily be sufficient to satisfy nexus. 
Calvert uses this language to suggest that the frequent 
correspondence and telephone calls between Biggs and Calvert, 
including the promissory note (Exhibit 1) and the assignments 
(Exhibits 2 and 3) , do not establish Utah's jurisdiction over 
Calvert. 
Calvert has omitted important language from this passage. 
Immediately after it the court dropped a footnote in which it 
stated, 
In Rambo fv. American Southern Insurance Co. , 839 
F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1988),] the court said: "Certainly, 
telephone calls and letters may provide sufficient 
contacts for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. . . 
. However, the exercise of jurisdiction depends on the 
nature of those contacts." (citations omitted, emphasis 
added) 
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STV Int'l, 750 F. Supp. at 1077 n.17. This footnote demonstrates 
that when assessing jurisdiction there are no hard and fast rules 
(as Calvert suggests), but rather a "fact and circumstances" 
analysis controls. The STV Int'l court underscored this point 
when, immediately after stating the passage quoted by Calvert, it 
decides to rule that a nexus did indeed exist after examining the 
"totality of facts." Id. 
There is no escaping the fact that Calvert was doing business 
in Utah, and was aware of that fact. He contracted with Utah 
residents, knowing that he would be sending payments to them in 
Utah. He executed assignments and subsequently sent them to Utah. 
He did the same with a promissory note. 
The nature of such contacts is substantial and not transitory. 
This is not a case where one is negotiating a purchase of an item 
for use outside the forum state, or communicating terms of a 
contract to be performed outside the forum state. Under such 
circumstances the nature of the communications would be of the sort 
contemplated by the STV Int'l court. Rather, here the 
communications constitute part of a contract to be performed 
substantially in Utah. Furthermore, the communications do not 
operate as some kind of snare to trick Calvert into appearing in 
the Utah courts. Rather, he knew that payments would be sent to 
Utah and that he was dealing with Utah residents. Indeed, at least 
one of the documents (Exhibit 4) contained a blank signature line 
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for Biggs: Calvert knew that the document would be signed in Utah, 
and Calvert ostensibly sent it to Utah primarily for that purpose. 
The case Calvert cites, Far West Capital v. Towne, 828 F. 
Supp. 909 (D. Utah 1993) , does not change this conclusion. Calvert 
misrepresents the similarity of Far West with the case at bar. In 
Far West the plaintiffs specifically alleged only seven contacts 
with Utah, none of which were face to face, and virtually all of 
which were facsimile transmission (two of which were followed up by 
phone calls). Id. at 913. Furthermore, the contract in Far West 
was not to be performed in any way in Utah, and was negotiated 
primarily in Nevada (where Towne was a resident) and California. 
Any Utah contacts in Far West were certainly sparse and of a 
transitory nature. They do not match in quantity or quality the 
contacts in this case. 
ii. Documents 
Calvert contends that the documents that Biggs submitted in 
support of his jurisdictional claim were inadmissible. When 
confronted with the fact that no objection was made below to these 
documents, he simply responds, without supporting authority, "No 
motion to strike was necessary." Brief of Appellee at 14. This 
response speaks for itself. It is hornbook law that an evidentiary 
objection in waived if a proper objection is not made at the proper 
time. Biggs cited the Franklin Financial case to underscore that 
point. When Calvert contends that Franklin Financial is 
inapposite, he is merely displaying his unwillingness to recognize 
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that basic principle of evidentiary law. Calvert strains at a gnat 
(Franklin Financial dealt with affidavits), while swallowing a 
camel (Franklin Financials point is that one must make evidentiary 
objections to preserve them on appeal). 
B. Due Process 
Calvert correctly recognizes that it is important for a 
defendant to anticipate that he will be subject to the forum 
state's jurisdiction, but errs in asserting that he could not 
anticipate being brought to court in Utah. As has been pointed 
out, this debt was to be paid to Utahns in Utah, and important 
documents concerning the debt were sent by Calvert to the Biggs in 
Utah. This is purposeful availment. 
It is simplistic of Calvert to invoke cases forbidding 
jurisdiction based merely on contracting with residents of the 
forum. This is not such a case. As noted above, Far West 
concerned a contract between a Nevada resident and a Utah resident, 
negotiated in Nevada and California, and to be performed outside of 
Utah. Another case cited by Calvert, Nicholas v. Buchanan, 806 
F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1986), concerns a contract between a Rhode 
Islander (plaintiff) and a Texan (defendant). The contract was 
solicited by the Rhode Islander, was to be performed in Texas, and 
virtually all correspondence concerning the contract originated in 
Rhode Island and was sent to Texas. There is, in short, no 
imaginable way to analogize this case to the one at bar. 
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Fairness is at the heart of the court's inquiry—that much is 
clear• The numerosity and substance of Calvert's communications 
with the Biggs, combined with his knowledge that payment would be 
made to the Biggs in Utah, demonstrate that Calvert should have 
anticipated suit in Utah. Furthermore, Calvert will suffer little 
inconvenience in having to defend the lawsuit here. The district 
court should be reversed. 
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